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INTRODUCTION

Since the enactment of the antitrust laws, policy makers, scholars, and business executives have debated whether the United
States antitrust laws chill export and investment abroad.1 The
* Professor of Law, New York University School of Law. This article was
funded by a grant from the New York University Law Center Foundation.
1. The debate is reflected in, e.g., NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF MANUFACTURERS,
1974 REPORT

OF THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF MANUFACTURERS ON THE INTERNAU.S. ANTITRUST LAWS (1974); UNITED STATES CHAMBER

TIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF

OF COMMERCE, FINAL REPORT OF THE ANTITRUST TASK FORCE ON INTERNATIONAL
TRADE

AND INVESTMENT OF THE UNITED STATES CHAMBER OF COMMERCE ON
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terms of the debate have not changed significantly for more than
a decade. The law and the government's enforcement policies,
however, have changed. Since the United States Department of
Justice issued its Guide on Antitrust and InternationalOperations (Guide) on January 26, 1977,2 law and enforcement policy
have become more hospitable to private business decisions that
would increase exports and foreign investment.
This Article attempts to update the Guide. It is confined
largely to substantive analysis of transactions which may have the
statutorily proscribed effect on competition. It does not address
the defenses based upon foreign government action or involvement, or the limits of United States personal or subject matter
jurisdiction over firms located abroad or acts committed abroad.
Since the issuance of the Guide in 1977, noteworthy change in
the direction of a more favorable attitude toward private business

UNITED STATES ANTITRUST LAWS AND AMERICAN EXPORTS

(1974); Schwechter &

Schepard, The Effects of United States Antitrust Laws on the International
Operations of American Firms, 1 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 492 (1979).
A strong case can be made that if the United States antitrust laws have an
impact in lessening exports and investment abroad, that impact is dwarfed by
other government laws and action. See, e.g., Dresser Indus., Inc. & Dresser
(France) S.A. v. Baldrige, No. 82-2385 (D.D.C. Aug. 25, 1982) (denying plaintiffs'
application for a temporary restraining order against the imposition of penalties
or sanctions under export control regulations that prohibit the sale to the Soviet
Union of oil and gas transmission equipment manufactured through use of technology licensed by United States firms). Assistant Attorney General William F.
Baxter, testifying on a bill that would authorize formation of a commission to
study the international applications of the United States antitrust laws, stated:
"The antitrust laws, correctly interpreted, are generally acknowledged not to impose a significant impediment to United States business in its efforts to compete
abroad." Reagan Administration Seeks Broad Mandatefor Special Commission
on Export Problems,ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 1043, at A-3, A-

4 (Dec. 10, 1981). The Assistant Attorney General testified that, if such a commission is formed, it should have a broad mandate to examine all statutory impediments to exports. Id. Laws that should be examined, he said, include the
general export control provisions and antiboycott regulations of the Export Administration Act, the Ribicoff Tax Amendments of 1976, the Trading with the
Enemy Act, Commodities Futures Trading Commission regulation of foreign
brokers, and the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. Id. Sherman Unger, General
Counsel of the Commerce Department, identified the application of other sovereigns' laws to exports from the United States as another impediment to exports.
Id.
2.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST DMSION, ANTITRUST

Jan. 26, 1977, [Special Ed.] TRADE REG.
REP. (CCH) (Feb. 1, 1977) [hereinafter cited as GUIDE].
GUIDE FOR INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS,
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decisions, and particularly international transactions, has been reflected by court decisions, government enforcement policies, and
legislative action. This analysis begins with an outline of some of
the important changes effected by law and enforcement policy,
and then reviews the 1977 Guide, including relevant case illustrations, to demonstrate when and how current law and policy may
indicate answers different from those given in the Guide.
Legislative change leads the list of developments producing a
freer environment for foreign business transactions. On October
8, 1982, President Reagan signed into law Public Law 97-290.1
The Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982, title IV
of the legislation, amends the Sherman Act by adding a new section, section 7.4 Section 7 provides that the Sherman Act does not
apply to exports or to foreign commerce other than import trade
unless the conduct involved "has a direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect" on (1) import commerce; (2) commerce
other than trade with foreign nations; or (3) export commerce of a
person engaged in such commerce in the United States.5 Thus,
when no harm is threatened to a seller doing business in or from
3. Pub. L. No. 97-290. Relevant portions are reprinted at [4 Federal Laws]
%V25,117, 25,245, 27,000-032.
4. Pub. L. No. 97-290, § 402, [4 Federal Laws] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) V

TRADE REG. REP. (CCH)
25,117.

5. Section 7 of the Sherman Act provides:
This Act shall not apply to conduct involving trade or commerce (other
than import trade or import commerce) with foreign nations unless(1) such conduct has a direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable
effect(A) on trade or commerce which is not trade or commerce with
foreign nations, or on import trade or import commerce with foreign
nations; or
(B) on export trade or export commerce with foreign nations, of
a person engaged in such trade or commerce in the United States;
and
(2) such effect gives rise to a claim under the provisions of this Act,
other than this section.
If this Act applies to such conduct only because of the operations of paragraph (1)(B), then this Act shall apply to such conduct only for injury to
export business in the United States.
Pub. L. No. 97-290, § 402, amending 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). The
Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act likewise qualifies the scope of § 5(a)
of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1976) (prohibiting unfair methods of competition), by adding parallel language to the end of § 5(a).
Pub. L. No. 97-290, § 403, [4 Federal Laws] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 25,245.
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the United States, the new law scales back the Sherman Act to
effects within the United States. Business people doing business
abroad are no longer at risk under the United States antitrust
laws for possible harm to competition in foreign markets. Title
III of the new legislation provides a procedure whereby applicants
wishing to engage in specific export trade activities may, under
stated conditions, receive a certificate of review from the Secretary of Commerce and thereby obtain a qualified antitrust exemption.7 Title II of the new legislation, the Bank Export Ser6. Congress failed to enact a provision in H.R. 5235, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. § 3
(1982), that specifically would have exempted from § 7 of the Clayton Act, 15
U.S.C. § 18 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980), the formation and operation of joint ventures limited to commerce with foreign nations other than import commerce.
The failure of Congress to enact this provision would appear to be inconsequential, for no merger or joint venture violates the Clayton Act unless it may substantially lessen competition "in any section of the country." Clayton Act, § 7.
Thus, the Clayton Act has never proscribed joint ventures when the only harmful impact would occur in foreign markets.
7. The Export Trade Certificates Review Act, Pub. L. No. 97-290, §§ 301-12,
[4 Federal Laws] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) T 27,020-032 (Oct. 8, 1982) [hereinaf-

ter titles I and III will both be referred to as the Export Trading Company Act].
The Act provides that the Secretary of Commerce, with the concurrence of the
Attorney General, shall issue an export trade certificate of review upon determining that the applicant's
export trade, export trade activities, and methods of operation will(1) result in neither a substantial lessening of competition or restraint of
trade within the United States nor a substantial restraint of the export
trade of any competitor of the applicant,
(2) not unreasonably enhance, stabilize, or depress prices within the
United States of the goods, wares, merchandise, or services of the class
exported by the applicant,
(3) not constitute unfair methods of competition against competitors engaged in the export of goods, wares, merchandise, or services of the class
exported by the applicant, and
(4) not include any act that may reasonably be expected to result in the
sale for consumption or resale within the United States of the goods,
wares, merchandise, or services exported by the applicant.
Id. § 303(a), reprinted at T 27,023.
No criminal or civil antitrust action may be brought against a holder of a
certificate of review for conduct specified in and complying with the terms of the
certificate. Any injured person, however, may sue for an injunction, actual damages, and costs including a reasonable attorney's fee, for the certificate holder's
failure to comply with the four standards quoted above. In such an action, there
is a presumption that conduct specified in and complying with the certificate
complies with the four standards. If the court finds that the conduct complies
with the standards, the defendant is entitled to costs including a reasonable at-
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vices Act, removes certain restrictions on the financing of export
trading companies by banking institutions.'
Supreme Court case law is a second source of change. Two major Supreme Court cases decided after January 1977 have a particularly direct bearing on the analysis of the substantive issues
with-which this Article is concerned. Continental TV, Inc. v,
GTE Sylvania Inc.9 and Broadcast Music Inc. v. Columbia
Broadcasting System10 (BM1) favor distributional restraints that

facilitate interbrand competition and collaboration among competitors reasonably necessary to establish or penetrate a market.
The Supreme Court's decision in GTE Sylvania is the most important recent legal development. It overrules United States v.
Arnold, Schwinn & Co.," which held that one who sells a product
may not limit the customers to whom or territories in which the
buyer may resell. The overruling of Schwinn marks the end of an
era of rigid application of per se rules and indicates that no per se
rule will survive when its application stands in the way of a more
competitive marketplace. 2 GTE Sylvania supersedes the analysis, and in some cases changes the result, of hypothetical examples set forth in the Guide. The Court's decision in BMI is the
second most important development in the case law. BMI reinforces the illustrative cases in the Guide indicating the permissibility of joint ventures when high costs and risks of independent
action would make a project infeasible or unattractive.13

torney's fee. Also, the Attorney General may sue "to enjoin conduct threatening
clear and irreparable harm to the national interest." Id. § 306, reprinted at

27,026.
8. Pub. L. No. 97-290, §§ 201-207.
9. 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
10. 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
11. 388 U.S. 365 (1967), overruled, Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania,
Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
12. Application of the per se rule would have prohibited Sylvania from as-

signing its distributors to stated locations. The prohibition would have deprived
Sylvania of an important tool by which to compete more effectively against
stronger competitors. GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 40-41.
13. Two other Supreme Court cases deserve comment. In Pfizer, Inc. v. Gov-

ernment of India, 434 U.S. 308, 313-15 (1978), the Supreme Court held that a
foreign government, as purchaser of price-fixed products, has the right to sue for
treble damages. The opinion in Pfizer states that antitrust remedies are not limited to the protection of United States citizens. See id. Pfizer left important
questions unanswered, especially in view of the fact that the foreign government
bought the price-fixed goods from United States producers engaged in a United
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The third realm of change is Justice Department policy. In
1977, the Department was ready and willing to apply Supreme
Court case law, whether or not based on efficiency principles; it
sought to protect export opportunities, and it took a flexible ap-

proach to principles appropriate to facilitate the competitive pro-

cess.1 4 In contrast, the Reagan Administration Justice Depart-

ment consolidates all antitrust theory into a single paradigm:
antitrust law exists only to promote allocative efficiency. Anti-

States conspiracy. Pfizer did not address the case in which the only breakdown
in competitive conditions occurs in foreign markets and in which only foreign
consumers are injured. That question has now been addressed by the new § 7 of
the Sherman Act, which provides that, in the latter case, the Sherman Act does
not apply. See supra text accompanying note 5.
Legislation to overrule Pfizer is pending. The House of Representatives
passed a bill that would limit recoveries by foreign governments to single damages. H.R. 5106, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982). In 1981 the Senate passed a similar
bill that would not only limit such recoveries to single damages but would also
deny recovery to a foreign government unless its law granted reciprocal rights to
the United States Government. See S. 816, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1981). Subsequently, the Senate passed H.R. 5106, but added a controversial unrelated
amendment, the Tris bill. S. 823, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982). The Senate apparently hopes to induce the House of Representatives to accept the Tris bill in
return for the Senate's foregoing its attempt to condition the Pfizer bill on reciprocity. See Senate Passes Pfizer Bill; Conference with House is Needed, 43
ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 1084, at 691 (1982).
National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978),
may also affect analysis of international antitrust issues. ProfessionalEngineers
held, in a domestic context, that only procompetitive effects may be offered to
justify an agreement that creates anticompetitive effects; therefore, societal
goals other than competition may not be offered to justify an otherwise illegal
restraint. ProfessionalEngineers, if taken literally and applied to foreign commerce, suggests that the promotion of exports is no defense to an otherwise illegal restraint of trade.
14. There is no one correct answer to the question: What is economically
sound antitrust policy? The GUIDE, supra note 2, modified to reflect the overruling of United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967), is consistent
with one view of an economically sound policy. This view protects an environment for dynamic competition and postulates that consumers will be better off if

substantial parts of the markets are kept open and contestable. Thus, this view
protects opportunities and rights not to be fenced out. See GUIDE, supra note 2,
at 5; see also Fox, The Modernization of Antitrust: A New Equilibrium, 66
CORNELL L. REV. 1140, 1169 (1981).
The Reagan Administration focuses more narrowly on specific behavior producing inefficiency. Officials postulate that private action is usually efficiencyproducing and that consumers are better off if government intervenes to prevent
only identified, inefficient transactions. See infra note 15.
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trust law should therefore reprehend only that which is inefficient.15 Only cartels" and certain monopolization" are inefficient
because they give a firm or firms power to raise prices and cut
back output without producing offsetting increases in efficiency.
The economic evil of output limitation may be illustrated as
follows. If the producers in market A limit their output-, by definition they produce too little to satisfy all consumers who wish to
purchase product A at a competitive price. Too few resources are
devoted to market A in light of consumer demand. Consumers
who would have bought product A substitute "inefficiently."
Their demand is diverted to product B, which costs society more

resources to make. Too many resources are devoted-or allocated-to market B.18 Preventing the misallocation of resources is
the sole goal of antitrust enforcement under the Reagan
Administration. 9
Cartels are the prime target of a policy focused on output limitation. Cartels may be created by an explicit agreement, an unspoken understanding, or the mere interdependence of very few
firms in a high-barrier market in which buyers need the product
and have no acceptable substitute.20 Cartel results are achieved

15. See generally Attorney General William French Smith's Remarks to District of Columbia Bar, reprinted in ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No.
1047, at H-1 (July 2, 1981) [hereinafter cited as Remarks of William French
Smith]; Interview with William F. Baxter, Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust
Division, Report from Official Washington, 51 A.B.A. ANTITRUST L.J. 23 (1982)
[hereinafter cited as 1982 Interview with William F. Baxter]; Panel Discussion-Interview with William F. Baxter, Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust
Division, 50 A.B.A. ANTITRUST L.J. 151 (1981) [hereinafter cited as 1981 Interview with William F. Baxter].
16. A cartel is an agreement among competitors to restrict production or to
achieve that result by raising prices or by dividing customers or territories.
17. Monopoly achieved by superior performance may reflect efficiencies in
the form of lower costs. The cost savings may offset the resource loss from output restriction. Monopoly achieved by merger is more likely to lead to output
restriction without compensating cost savings.
18. For a discussion of allocative efficiency as a basis for antitrust enforcement, see Fox, supra note 14, at 1159-66.
19. See generally 1982 Interview with William F. Baxter, supra note 15;
1981 Interview with William F. Baxter, supra note 15. Resources may also be
misallocated by buyer cartels. The Justice Department recently sued and settled
with Japanese firms that allegedly agreed on prices to be paid for Alaskan tanner crabs. United States v. C. Itoh & Co., 1982-1983 Trade Cas. (CCH)

65,010

(W.D. Wash. 1982).
20. When buyers have no good substitutes, demand is inelastic. That is, de-
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traditionally by agreement on price, which in turn limits output.21
They also can be achieved by mergers that produce the conditions
for interdependence 2 and by agreements among competitors to
divide markets or to suppress competitive technology.23
Translated into an international context, the Department's
principal concerns are eliminating cartels and blocking transac-

tions that facilitate cartel-like behavior. Targets for enforcement
include international cartels and technology sharing arrangements
between actual or potential competitors who have power over out-

put, transnational mergers that facilitate output restriction in the
United States, and competitor collaboration that is unnecessary
to increase sales abroad and that provides a forum for cartel

agreements at home. On the other hand, United States competitors, who, in combination, do not have market power 24 at home or
abroad could by agreement export at a common price25 without
mand will not be affected significantly by a small but not insignificant rise in
price. Elastic demand indicates that buyers will shift their demand in the face of
a small but significant rise in price. Low entry barriers indicate that new suppliers will provide the product if the present producers raise their price. If either
demand or supply by fringe firms is elastic, potential cartelists cannot maintain
a cartel price because buyer or seller response will undermine their efforts.
Therefore, they will be unable to reduce output and distort resource allocation.
21. See F. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 169-71 (2d ed. 1980).
22. See Merger Guidelines promulgated by the Department of Justice in
1982, [Extra Ed.] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) No. 546 (June 14, 1982) [hereinafter
cited as 1982 Merger Guidelines].
23. The emergence of competitive technology could destabilize a cartel.
Competitive technology can be suppressed through patent pooling and requirements by the patentee that the licensee grant back to the patentee the exclusive
rights to all improvements invented by the licensee. Pooling (e.g., of blocking
patents) and exclusive grantbacks, however, also can have benign or proefficiency effects. See A.B. Lipsky, Jr., Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, Remarks before the American Bar Association, Antitrust Section,
National Institute on Critical Issues in International Antitrust and Unfair Competition Law, Patent Licensing Practices-Antitrust Division Reappraisal,
Nov. 5, 1981, reprinted in 5 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 50,434 [hereinafter cited
as Remarks of A.B. Lipsky, Jr.].
24. Market power connotes power over output. Market power is the power to
raise prices and to hold the price increases in the face of buyer and seller substitutability. If the price is raised artificially, output is restricted.

25. This is price-fixing if the purpose of the agreement is to set a common
price rather than to organize a joint enterprise that integrates exporting functions and operates as a single entity. Such price-fixing is illegal per se if the sales
are made domestically, even if the parties to the agreement have no market
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threatening any distortion in the allocation of resources, and they
were not likely to raise Justice Department concerns even before
enactment of the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act.26

The Justice Department policy of challenging only output-limiting transactions would give businesses more freedom from Government action than does the law. The law continues to prohibit
certain private restraints that impair competitive opportunities or
reduce the likely development of competitive technologies but
cannot be shown to restrict output.2 7 Because the law provides a
private right of action, businesses cannot, with complete security,
rely on a government policy not to challenge certain activity.
Nonetheless, a government policy of hospitality may be a persuasive consideration to a court considering the merits of a marginal
private case. Moreover, to the extent that government policy reflects the law, as it largely does in the area of nonprice distributional restraints, it should control.
This Article applies the newly developed law and the newly articulated government policy to the analysis of the relevant illustrative cases in the 1977 Guide.
power. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 224-26 & n.59
(1940). That is because the per se rule is a broad, prophylactic rule against
price-fixing and is designed to establish pricing-independence as the ethic of
business. See Fox, supra note 14, at 1184-85.
Until the enactment in 1982 of the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements
Act, see supra note 5, the application of the Sherman Act to export price-fixing
was in doubt. If competing producers of a product formed a Webb-Pomerene
Association and registered their association with the Federal Trade Commission,
the Sherman Act was and is suspended as long as the parties do not harm competition within the United States. Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 61-66 (1976). The
Webb-Pomerene Act applies only to products, not services. It remains law notwithstanding the 1982 legislaton. See supra notes 3-8. If, however, exporters did
not register as a Webb-Pomerene Assocation and agreed to fix export prices, it
was unclear whether their agreement was subject to the per se rule and unclear
whether United States law was simply inapplicable if the only victims were foreign consumers. See, e.g., Baker, Antitrust and World Trade: Tempest in an
InternationalTeapot?, 8 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 16, 27-28 (1974) (the antitrust laws
do not protect foreign producers or foreign consumers injured by a breakdown of
competition in foreign markets); Rahl, American Antitrust and Foreign Operations: What is Covered?, 8 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 1 (1974) (United States antitrust
laws apply to export price-fixing because the restraint is in commerce).
Although United States law does not prohibit transactions that have a harmful impact only on foreign economies, the laws of a host country may do so.
26. See supra text accompanying note 4.

27. Cf. Blue Shield of Va. v. McCready, 102 S. Ct. 2540 (1982).
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THE GUIDE AND THE CURRENT ENFORCEMENT POLICY

A.

The 1977 Guide

The Guide states that antitrust enforcement by the Government has two major purposes in connection with international
commerce. First, the Justice Department will seek to protect
United States consumers by insuring that they receive the benefit
of the products and ideas produced by foreign domestic competitors.2 Second, the Department will seek "to protect American export and investment opportunities against privately imposed restrictions. '29 Each firm "engaged in the export of goods, services,
or capital should be allowed to compete on the merits and not be
shut out by some restriction imposed by a bigger or less principled competitor." 30 The Guide states that a very large proportion
of the international transactions entered into by United States
firms will not violate either policy-protection of United States
consumers or protection of export opportunities of United States
competitors.3 1 In the event that neither policy is violated, the
transaction "will not involve violations of U.S. antitrust law ....
This is especially true of those transactions involving the development or expansion of export markets, whether this be through the
formation of foreign subsidiaries, joint ventures, licensing arrangements or distributorships."3 2
B. Current Enforcement Policy
Justice Department enforcement policy is formulated differently today. The purpose of antitrust enforcement with respect to
international commerce is the same as the purpose of antitrust
enforcement with respect to domestic commerce-to promote the
efficient allocation of resources. 3 If resources are allocated effi-

ciently within the United States-that is, allocated to their best
use in light of consumer demand-all United States consumers
presumably will benefit.
United States consumers also will benefit if United States law
prevents distortion in the allocation of resources by United States
28.

GUIDE, supra note 2, at 4-5.

29. Id. at 5.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 5-6.
33. See supra note 15.

THE ANTITRUST GUIDE
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competitors who produce for export a product that returns to the
United States. The higher-than-competitive price charged by the
United States exporters would cause inefficient substitution away
from the exported product, increase the cost of products produced abroad, and raise the price of products United States consumers buy.-Current Department of Justice officials would not include as an
enforcement objective the protection of United States export and
investment opportunities as such, or protection of the right to
compete on the merits and the corollary right not to be shut out
of markets by private restraints. The Department, however, does
agree with the 1977 Guide that the law should protect United
States consumers, and that most international transactions do not
impair the interests of United States consumers and thus should
35
be encouraged.
III.

A.

ILLUSTRATIVE CASES

Case A: A Multinational Operation

Case A raises the question whether and when a multinational
corporation legally may allocate territories between and among its
various wholly or partly owned subsidaries. The answer given by
the Justice Department in 1977 is that the multinational enterprise may allocate territories among its subsidaries and set the
prices at which they sell, even when the enterprise has a domi-

nant position in most markets.3 6
The 1977 Guide treats territorial allocation by a multinational
enterprise as a unilateral act of one enterprise rather than as an
agreement among competitors, as long as the parent corporation
fully controls the subsidiaries. 7 Control generally is established,
the Guide states, when the parent controls a majority of the voting stock of the subsidiary. Control may be established even when
the parent has a minority position in the subsidiary, if it main38
tains effective working control.
34. The above analysis assumes that each distortion in resource allocation
impairs allocative efficiency. That is not necessarily the case. Distortions may
negate one another. See Markovitz, Monopolistic Competition, Second Best,

and the Antitrust Paradox:A Review Article, 77 MICH. L. REv. 567 (1979).
35. See Remarks of William French Smith, supra note 15.
36.

GUIDE, supra note 2, at 12.

37. Id.
38. Id.
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Case A raises the technical legal question of when an allocation
of territories is a single-firm act. Substantively, it distinguishes
between the effort of co-conspirators to use one competitor's minority stock interest in the other as a cover for an international
cartel,3 9 on the one hand, and the effort of a single enterprise to
allocate its own resources internally so as to develop fully each
territory in which it sells.40
Case A recites and applies principles of law that long have been
accepted by the Department of Justice and can be expected to be
applied today.4 ' The importance of Case A lies not so much in its
clarification of law as in its presentation of an appropriate international principle-the right of multinational corporations to allocate their resources within their own enterprises as they see fit.
In the late 1970s, negotiations for an International Code on Restrictive Business Practices proceeded under the auspices of the
United Nations Committee on Technology and Development. Developing countries contended that the multinationals' practice of
contractually barring subsidiaries in developing countries from
exporting to lucrative markets assigned to sister corporations was
a means of allocating territories 42 and unreasonably restricted the
trade of developing countries. The developing countries urged
that each subsidiary of a multinational corporation should be
treated as a separate entity capable of conspiring with its parent
39. See Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951).
40. Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977) addresses
the different situation in which the company does business through independent
distributors. In that event more than one actor is involved. In certain cases of
high market concentration, the producers can, by giving territorial protection to
each of their distributors, aggrandize their market power and restrain interbrand competition.
If a single firm, even a monopolist, allocates resources within its corporate
family by assignments of territory, it does not violate § 1 of the Sherman Act
because the allocation is a single firm act. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976). Section 2 of the
Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1976), is not violated because, by the allocation, the
firm is not aggrandizing or abusing the power that it already has. If, however,
sister corporations that hold themselves out as competitors agree to divide territories or fix prices, the agreement is likely to be regarded as a horizontal agreement between two entities in violation of section 1. See Kiefer-Stewart Co. v.
Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211 (1951); Joseph Cicione & Sons v.
Eastern Indus., Inc., 1982-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 64,737 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
41. See Gill, The UNCTAD Restrictive Business PracticesCode: A Code for

Competition?, 13

INT'L LAW.

607, 612-13 (1979).

42. See Davidow, The United States, Developing Countries and the Issue of
Intra-enterpriseAgreements, 7 GA. J. INT'L & Comp. L. 507 (1977).
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and affiliates. 43 The developing countries ultimately gave important concessions. The participating nations agreed to a voluntary
code, which was approved by the United Nations General Assembly in December 1980. 44 The code provides that "enterprise"

means, among other things, a corporation, and includes its
"branches, subsidiaries, affiliates or other entities directly or indi'4 5
rectly controlled by [it]."

Thus, the UNCTAD Code may be construed to recognize the
right of a single enterprise to allocate its own resources and to
incorporate the principle of Case A.' 6
B. Case B: A United States Firm's Foreign Acquisition
In Case B, Razors, Inc. (RI), a United States company, is the
largest manufacturer of razor blades in the United States and in
the world. It accounts for half of all United States and worldwide
razor blade sales. RI wishes to buy Glint, a German manufacturer
that has developed a cadmium steel razor blade arguably superior
to the blades offered by RI and other major firms. Glint, which
has begun selling these blades in Germany on a low advertising
budget, accounts for less than one percent of all razor blade sales
in Germany and makes insignificant export sales to the United
States. RI has the technical capability to manufacture cadmium
blades, but has decided not to do so either in the United States or
abroad.
The Guide raises two problems, both relating to section 7 of the
Clayton Act, which prohibits mergers or acquisitions of firms engaged in commerce or in any activity affecting commerce where
the effect may be substantially to lessen competition in the
United States or any section of the country.47 First, does section 7
of the Clayton Act apply to the transaction, in view of Glint's
limited involvement in United States commerce? Second, is the
43. Id. at 511-13.
44. The Code, entitled The Set of Multilaterally Agreed Equitable Principles and Rules for the Control of Restrictive Business Practices, [hereinafter
cited as UNCTAD Code] is United Nations General Assembly Resolution 35/63.
The Code is reprinted in ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP., (BNA) No. 963, at G-1
(May 8, 1980).
45. Id., reprinted at G-2.
46. Cf. B. HAWK, UNITED STATES, COMMON MARKET AND INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST: A COMPARATIVE GUIDE 215-16 (1979) (noting ambiguities in the UNCTAD

Code).
47. Clayton Act § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
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acquisition one whose effect may be to lessen competition substantially within the United States within the meaning of section
7?48
Analysis of the commerce question under section 7 was impor-

tant to the Guide's discussion of Case B. That analysis has been
superseded 'by a 1980 amendment.49 Before 1980, section 7 applied only if the parties were "engaged in [interstate or United
States foreign] commerce." 50 Under the amendment, the law applies if the merging parties are engaged either "in commerce or in
any activity affecting commerce." 51 Accordingly, if Glint is engaged either in commerce with the United States (which it apparently is not) or in any activity affecting commerce, section 7 of
the Clayton Act now applies. If Glint were an important potential
entrant into a highly concentrated United States razor blade market, and if its threat of entry kept United States prices lower than
they otherwise would have been, Glint's business activity literally
would affect United States commerce. This effect may be sufficient to invoke amended section 7.52 Case B, however, does not

suggest that Glint is an important potential entrant exerting a
moderating effect. Therefore it is unlikely that section 7 applies,
even in view of the 1980 amendment.5
48. GUIDE, supra note 2, at 15-16.
49. Pub. L. No. 96-349, § 6(a), 94 Stat. 1157 (1980), (amending Clayton Act
§ 7, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1976)).
50. Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 7, 38 Stat. 731 (1914), amended by Clayton Act,
ch. 1184, § 1, 64 Stat. 1125 (1950).
51. Pub. L. No. 96-349, § 6(a), 94 Stat. 1157 (1980).
52. The case is strongest if Glint's moderating effect stems from the fact that
it is actually preparing to enter the United States market. It is weakest if the
moderating effect should occur despite Glint's passive disinterest in entering the
United States market. Moderating effects, however, are not likely to occur in the
latter event. Moreover, under the facts postulated, interests of United States
consumers are at stake, and one party to the transaction is a United States company and thus both legally and equitably subject to the substantive constraints
of United States law. It would be sound policy, therefore, to recognize that a
foreign firm whose perceived potential for entry moderates price in a concentrated United States market in which its prospective merger partner operates is,
for that reason, engaged in an activity affecting commerce within the meaning of
amended § 7 of the Clayton Act.
53. Current Justice Department officials might avoid analysis of whether
Glint is engaged in an activity affecting United States commerce, for this is a
test peculiar to § 7 of the Clayton Act. The Sherman Act prohibits mergers that
unreasonably restrain trade, and the Justice Department currently takes the position that the standards for illegality under the Sherman Act and the Clayton
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If the statute were applicable, we would reach the substantive
question-does the acquisition lessen competition or threaten to
do so as a matter of reasonable probabilities? The 1977 Guide
and the 1982 Merger Guidelines begin analysis on common
ground: If the acquisition of Glint lessens competition, it must do
so because it eliminates one of few potential entrants into a highly concentrated United States market. A negative effect on competiton may be produced by either (1) elimination of a moderating influence on price by acquisition of a potential entrant that
had such an effect, or (2) elimination of the probability that the
acquired firm (the potential entrant) would have entered the market independently of the acquiring firm and would have added a
major new competitive force to a noncompetitive market.5 '
The 1977 Guide, however, gives little insight into when a
merger of potential competitors may produce these effects. The
1982 Merger Guidelines are explicit. 55 The 1982 Guidelines set
forth certain conditions that must usually be present before a
merger of firms that are not competitiors can be expected to produce an output restraint.56 First, the market must be very highly

concentrated. The 1982 Guidelines measure the level of market
concentration by the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), which
is computed by summing the squares of the shares of all firms in
the market.5 7 Unless the HHI exceeds 1800, the Government is
unlikely to sue.5 Second, even if concentration surpasses 1800,
Act are identical. See 1982 Merger Guidelines, supra note 22, at 11; 1981 Interview with William F. Baxter, supra note 15, at 158-59. The Sherman Act requires only that the transaction substantially affect commerce. See, e.g., Burke
v. Ford, 389 U.S. 320, 321 (1967).
54. See 1982 Merger Guidelines, supra note 22, at 39-44; see also United
States v. Marine Bancorporation, 418 U.S. 602 (1974). The Supreme Court has
reserved the question whether elimination of more competitive entry ("entry effect") may, in itself, ever violate § 7 of the Clayton Act, since such an acquisition does not make market conditions worse but simply blocks a chance to make
them better. Marine Bancorporation,418 U.S. at 636-37.
55. 1982 Merger Guidelines, supra note 22, at 39-44.
56. Both of the identified effects on competition, see supra text accompanying note 54, may restrain output by eliminating a force that could increase obstacles to collusion by the incumbent firms.
57. For an explanation of how the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index works, see
Fox, The New Merger Guidelines-A Blueprint for Microeconomic Analysis, 27
ANTITRUST BULL. (1982) (in publication).
58. 1982 Merger Guidelines, supra note 22, at 42. An HHI of 1800 roughly
corresponds with a four-firm concentration ratio of 80% if the four firms have
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the Justice Department is not likely to challenge a merger of potential competitors if there are more than two other firms that
possess the same entry advantage as the acquired firm or if entry
is easy. 9
The 1977 Guide notes, and the 1982 Guidelines suggest, that
the acquisition of Glint probably does not fulfill the conditions of
an illegal potential-competition acquisition." Glint is probably
not a major potential entrant into the United States market. It is
not an industry leader abroad, and it has small size and limited
resources. It probably is not capable of entering the United States
market. There is no indication that it has exerted a moderating
effect on the price of razor blades in the United States.
The apparent agreement between the Guide and the Merger
Guidelines on the appropriate outcome of Case B should not mislead the reader. The facts of Case B present an easy case because
Glint was not a significant potential entrant into the United
States market. The Guide suggests that acquisition of small, inventive Glint by the largest manufacturer of razor blades in the

world would be anticompetitive if Glint were a significant potential entrant.6 1 Even if Glint were a significant potential entrant,
however, present Justice Department policy would require extensive further analysis. The Department would require answers to
questions of the following sort: If a hypothetical single razor blade
producer in the United States raised prices by a small but significant amount, such as five percent, would buyers shift to electric
razors or other substitutes? Would foreign blade producers ship
into the United States market? Would producers of similar products shift their facilities to the production of razor blades? All
such responses by buyers and suppliers within six months to a
year6 2 would be relevant market data, and the market would be

relatively equal market shares, and a four-firm concentration ratio of 70% if the
firms have unequal market shares.
59. Id. at 43.
60. Compare GUIDE, supra note 2, at 17 with 1982 Merger Guidelines, supra
note 22, at 26-43.
61. See GUIDE, supra note 2, at 16-17.
62. The 1982 Merger Guidelines measure shifts within one year by (1) buyers

who would turn to substitute products, (2) suppliers who have existing facilities
but make a different product, and (3) suppliers who make and sell the same
product in a different geographic area. 1982 Merger Guidelines, supra note 14,

at 16, 23, 25. After defining the market, the Justice Department considers
whether new entry within two years is likely. Id. at 32.
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expanded to reflect the probable shifts. If the concentration in
this expanded market fell short of 1800 on the HHI, or if entry
was easy or other substantial potential competitors numbered
more than three, the Department would be likely to conclude that
the merger would not produce sufficient lasting market power to
warrant suit.6 3
C.

Case C: Joint Bidding

Case C recites that several United States electrical equipment
manufacturers and engineering firms have formed a consortium
for the purposes of submitting a bid on a very large hydroelectric
project in a Latin American country. The consortium includes
three United States equipment manufacturers who rank second,
third, and sixth among United States manufacturers, and three
engineering firms, who rank first, fifth, and eighth among United
States engineering firms. The consortium will be competing
against similar groups supported by the Japanese and British
Governments. The project is too large for a smaller group to
finance, and a smaller group would not have the necessary technical capabilities. The project will take nearly ten years to complete. The parties are concerned about political risks in the host
country. 4
The Guide analyzes the joint venture in three steps. First, does
the joint venture, in essence, unreasonably restrain competition? 5 The reasons for the formation of the joint venture are relevant to this question (presumably because intent is some evidence of effect). In this case the goal of the joint venture was to
be a better competitor against similar consortia from other coun-

tries which are supported by their governments, possibly through
subsidization. Apparently, the United States participants fear
that, without this coordination, their bid would not be competitive. The Guide says: "[T]here is no reason to suspect that the
joint venture either would eliminate competition in the domestic
63. Id. at 42-43.
64. The fact pattern of Case C resembles a proposal made by General Electric, Allis Chalmers, Westinghouse Electric, and others to form a consortium to
provide turbine generators for a major Latin American project. GUIDE, supra
note 2, at 21; Department of Justice Press Release, May 10, 1976. The venture
was cleared under the Business Review procedure by the Department of Justice.

Id.
65.

GUIDE,

supra note 2, at 20.
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U.S. market or foreclose export opportunities for U.S. firms.""8
The Guide concludes that the joint venture is, therefore, permissible. The second question posed by the Guide is: Does the joint
venture have any unreasonable collateral restraints? 67 In this case
there were no collateral restraints. The third question is: Is the
joint venture a "bottleneck monopoly," and is access so important
to United States competitors that exclusion results in a serious
handicap making it necessary that the venture "be open to all on
reasonable and nondiscriminatory terms?"88 The Guide concludes
that the consortium was not an essential facility; other engineers
and equipment suppliers could form their own consortia to bid on
the project.69 Therefore, they would not be handicapped. The
Guide cautions that a joint venture among competitors involves
the risk that their cooperation may "spill over" into other areas,
and suggests that in some circumstances it may be desirable for
the joint venture to have separate personnel in order to reduce
day to day contact among officials of the competitor members.
The conclusion of current Justice Department officials would be
the same. The analysis, however, would be somewhat different.
First, the Department would not ask whether this joint venture
forecloses important export opportunities for United States firms
or whether it imposes a serious handicap on them.70 The Justice
Department would not worry about any disadvantage to competitors unless the disadvantage is of a dimension that would cause
output restriction and price increases, and that dimension is not
present in this case.71 A joint venture to export or to bid on a
project abroad probably would never be such an essential facility.
More centrally, while the discussion in Case C is hospitable to
joint bidding, the current Justice Department views joint bidding
with an even more favorable attitude. One of the essential
messages of the Reagan Administration's Justice Department is
that joint ventures likely to increase business abroad will be encouraged. As Attorney General William French Smith promised
in a speech to the District of Columbia Bar in June 1981:
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 21-22.
70. See 1981 Interview with William F. Baxter, supra note 15, at 153.
71. Case M, however, may be such a case. See infra text accompanying notes
146-59; see also United States v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n, 224 U.S. 383 (1912) (one
railroad turntable controlling railroad traffic across the United States).
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We will.
undertake a broad reassessment of our antitrust enforcement practices concerning international commerce-and especially joint ventures by American businesses that are not likely to
have anticompetitive effects on domestic markets. The federal government should not-and rational antitrust enforcement need
not-impede American firms' efforts to compete internationally."2
Finally, consistent with its view that businesses need clearer
signals of right and wrong, the current Justice Department would
be more specific about the type of harm it would seek to prevent.
That harm, of course, is output restriction. There is a threat of
output restriction when the joint venturers are competitors and
the joint venture encompasses so many firms in a concentrated
market, accounting for so much of that market that "the opportunity to get together and discuss the joint venture role is likely to
facilitate collusion in the markets from which they came. '7 3
The 1982 Merger Guidelines provide a relatively clear statement of the conditions under which the Department believes collusion is likely to be feasible and profitable. From the perspective
of the 1982 Guidelines, the range at which dangers of collusion
develop begins at about 1000 on the HHI. At 1800 and above,
these dangers are likely to be serious.7 4 Nevertheless, easy entry
would negate the danger of collusion, and a variety of other market factors may indicate a greater or lesser danger. 5 If conditions
in the market in which the joint venturers compete indicate the
feasibility and profitability of collusion, then a joint venture that
brings those firms closer together may dangerously enhance opportunities for collusion. If, on the other hand, the market factors
indicate that collusion is neither feasible nor profitable, the current Justice Department is not likely to challenge the consortium
for bidding on a project abroad. Even if the factors indicate that
collusion is probable, current Justice Department officials might
decide that the benefits of allowing the.venturers to realize significant economies of scale outweigh the costs of an increased risk of

collusion at home.

72. Remarks of William French Smith, supra note 15, at H-3.
73. 1981 Interview with William F. Baxter, supra note 15, at 161.
74. 1982 Merger Guidelines, supra note 22, at 29-30.
75. Id. at 31-39.
76. For example, Assistant Attorney General Baxter stated:
One can imagine circumstances where the case for aggregation in the joint
venture activity is so powerful, because of extreme conditions of increasing
returns to scale at the joint venture level, that one would simply have to
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In sum, both the 1977 Guide and the policy of the 1980s indicate concern regarding collusion. Current government policy
statements, however, raise this concern to center stage. They are
explicit in identifying conditions under which collusion is believed
to be a danger, and add that dangers of collusion may be outweighed by scale economies. Moreover, the 1977 Guide protects
opportunities important to United States exporters, whereas policy of the 1980s would not.
Members of a consortium like the one described in Case C may
apply for an export trade certificate of review, as authorized by
the Export Trading Company Act of 1982. Issuance of the certificate would require a determination by the Secretary of Commerce, with the concurrence of the Attorney General, that the
specified export activities and methods of operation will not harm
competition within the United States or the export trade of any
competitor, constitute an unfair method of competition against
competitors engaged in the export of like services, or be reasonably expected to result in the sale or resale of the goods or services
in the United States. Even after issuance of such a certificate,
the holder is protected from antitrust actions only if its conduct
is specified in and complies with the terms of the certificate, and
even then the protection is only partial.78 In view of the facts that
certificate holders receive only qualified protection from antitrust
litigation and that the holder subjects itself to a new, single-damage cause of action for unfair methods of competition, it is not
obvious that the new certification procedure will be used widely.
D.

Case D: Joint Research

Case D advances the analysis of problems that may flow from
competitor collaboration. It poses the first of several problems on
technology transfers. RXI is the second largest of five producers
of X-metal in the United States. British Metals is one of the larg-

get a firm grip on his stomach and say, "Sure there are dangers flowing
back. Let us see if they cannot do this through some independently established company that can attain the scale economies rather than doing it in
the joint venture form." I just don't want all those vice presidents in
charge of sales meeting as a board of directors in New York once a month.
1981 Interview with William F. Baxter, supra note 14, at 161.
77. Pub. L. No. 97-290, § 303, [4 Federal Laws] TRADE REG. RFY. (CCH)
1 27,023.
78. See supra note 7.
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est X-metal producers in the Common Market. X-metal is currently produced from X-ore, but the process is costly. Several
producers, including RXI and British Metals, have been trying to
develop a substitute process, but thus far no one has been successful. RXI and British Metals wish to enter into a joint venture,
in the form of a new British company equally owned by each parent, to develop a process for producing X-metal from materials
other than X-ore. The joint company will seek to obtain patents
covering its processes. It will give RXI an exclusive license to all
patent rights and use of know-how in North America, and will
give British Metals all such rights in Great Britain and the Common Market.
The Guide asks the three questions identified in Case C as applicable to joint ventures.7 9 It observes that no essential-facility

problem is raised by the facts 80 and it proceeds to ask whether
the joint venture is appropriate in essence, and whether it involves any unreasonable collateral restraints.8 1
The basic antitrust problem posed by Case D is the possible
lessening of competitive incentives to develop new technology
when the firms whose technological competition is eliminated are
two of the few major producers of the product in question. There
is no suggestion in the 1977 Guide that the collaborative activity
itself (as opposed to possible spill-over effects) will lead to an increase in price over current price. Indeed, the suggestion is that if
the collaboration is successful, and thus a cheaper process is
available, price will decline.8 2 The harm apparently envisioned by
the Guide stems from elimination of the possibility that, proceeding independently, each company would have provided a spur to
the other to invent a cheaper way to make X-metal, and both
might have developed separate low-cost alternatives, thereby benefiting consumers.8 3
The Guide declares that the joint venture is likely to be unobjectionable. While observing that the joint venture would eliminate competition between the two venturers in the development
79. GUIDE, supra note 2, at 23.
80.

Id.

81. Id. at 25.

82. See id. at 23-24.
83. This latter inquiry-whether the market would become more competitive
if the joint venture were barred than if it were permitted-was the inquiry
framed by the Supreme Court in United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 378

U.S. 158 (1964).
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of an alternative process for producing X-metal, it states that
there is no antitrust objection if the cost and risk of the research
are so great that the parties would not undertake it on their own.
It notes further that, because other leading firms will continue to
parallel the research efforts of the joint venture, a competitive
spur to the joint venture's research efforts seems assured. 4 The
Guide cautions that, because the joint venturers are two of a
small group of X-metal producers, spill-over effect (collusion by
the parents) should be guarded against, and the joint venture
85
should not be unnecessarily broad in duration or scope.
Current Justice Department officials probably also would conclude that the joint venture is in essence reasonable, but spillover effect (collusion) would be its central, rather than ancillary,
concern. To determine the feasibility of collusion, the present enforcers would begin their analysis by defining the market. They
would ask: Does X-metal have any good substitutes? Are barriers
to production of it (and its good substitutes) high? Is the market

highly concentrated? Only if elasticity of demand and of fringe
supply are low, and competitors are few, could attempts by the
joint venturer's parents to raise price and restrict output be
successful.
If output restriction is not feasible, the Department would be
unlikely to have any further concern. If it is feasible, and if movement in that direction may be facilitated by collaboration between these two major producers (who presumably are either
competitors or potential competitors), the Department would ask
whether the costs and risks of the research are so high, compared
with probable return on investment, that the parties probably
would not undertake or continue the research unilaterally, and
whether the combination of the knowledge and skills of the two
partners is likely to reduce the c6sts and risks, compared with
probable return, to attractive proportions. If the answers are affirmative, the Department would probably approve the joint venture but would require that precautions be taken to assure corporate separation and to prevent the new company from becoming a
forum for conversations among its parents' salespeople. The Department, like the 1977 Guide, would be likely to require that the
joint venture be reasonably limited in scope and duration. 6

84.
85.

GUIDE, supra note 2, at 24-25.

Id. at 25.

86. See supra discussion of Case C. The GUIDE suggests that the antitrust
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The second inquiry in Case D is: Are there any unreasonable
collateral restraints? Is it unreasonably restrictive for the joint
venturers to agree that the United States partner would get exclusive rights to the patents and know-how in North America,
that the British partner would get exclusive rights to the patents
and know-how in Great Britain and the Common Market, 87 and
that the joint venturers would conduct all of their research operations through the joint company? The 1977 Guide equivocates on
the question of division of territory. It states that the lawfulness
of the division would be determined by the rule of reason 8 but

laws may appropriately bar transactions merely because they lessen competitive
incentives of major producers to develop new technology under circumstances in
which there is little technological competition from others. See GuMEn, supra
note 2, at 23. In the 1982 Merger Guidelines, the Justice Department identified
as its only merger enforcement objective preventing mergers that increase power
over price. 1982 Merger Guidelines, supra note 22, at 11-13. The GuIDE's concerns harmonize with the concern of the Merger Guidelines where the producers
have power over price.
87. The parties in this case contemplate that the joint venture will obtain
patents on a process rather than on a product. The United States Patent Code
gives the patentee the right to convey the exclusive right to practice the patent
in the United States or any specified part of it. 35 U.S.C. § 261 (1976). Section
261 arguably overrides the antitrust laws and allows the patentee to confine
sales of a patented product to a stated territory regardless of the competitive
consequences. But see L. SULLIVAN, ANTITRUST § 184 (1977).
Unlike the owner of a product patent, the owner of a process patent does not
gain rights to apportion territories from the Patent Code; a process patent conveys merely the right to use the process and does not convey the right to sell the
unpatented product made therefrom. This distinction was commonly invoked by
product patentees when United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365
(1967), was law, because territorial restraints were illegal per se unless author-

ized by the Patent Code. Since GTE Sylvania overruled Schwinn, see supra
text accompanying note 11, § 261 of the Patent Code has receded in importance.
Vertical territorial restraints are no longer illegal per se under the antitrust laws;
they are usually reasonable, and therefore the proponent of the restraint usually
does not need to rely upon the Patent Code to validate the restraint.
Vertical territorial restraints may offend the antitrust laws if they facilitate
collusion among few sellers in a well defined market. Thus, if three patentees
share a market and all license third parties to make and sell, they might increase
their power by imposing tight territorial restraints on their licensees. If the patentee is the only seller in the market, however, collusion would not be the problem. The patentee could not increase its power by imposing territorial or other
restraints. See United States v. Studiengesellschaft Kohle, 670 F.2d 1122 (D.C.
Cir. 1981).
88. At the time of the issuance of the GUIDE, territorial divisions, whether
vertical or horizontal, were illegal per se. E.g., Schwinn, 388 U.S. at 376. Prior to
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does not state how it would apply the rule. It fails to address the
second question; namely, the lawfulness of the agreement not to
engage in competitive research.
At present, Justice Department officials would analyze the collateral restraints in terms of output restriction. If the United
States market for X-metal is not susceptible to collusion or monopolization, the analysis would not proceed further. There are
two cases in which collateral restraints might lead to lower output
than that which would be optimal after the new technology is introduced.8 9 In one scenario, the parties would proceed with the
joint venture even if both venturers received licenses under all
patents and even if each retained the right to perform independent research. Nonetheless, they agree to the two collateral restraints. The joint venture is formed and proceeds to produce a
new, much lower-cost technology that no other competitor is able
to duplicate. British Metals cannot compete ii the United States
for the life of the basic patent (and longer if the joint venture
obtains improvement patents) because it has agreed to give RXI
exclusive rights in the United States, and its own higher-cost
technology has become noncompetitive. British Metals cannot in-

vent around the patent because it has foregone the freedom to do
its own research, and any additional joint research will inure to
the benefit of RXI in the United States. RXI monopolizes the
United States market and British Metals monopolizes sales in the
Common Market.
In the second scenario, the joint venture and other United
States competitors develop alternative low-cost technologies.
Concentration is so high, however, that the elimination of British
the issuance of the GUIDE, Justice Department officials had stated publicly that
territorial divisions were illegal even when affected by patent licensing. The
GUIDE took a contrary position and stated that territorial division created by
reason of patent rights is "not now regarded by the Department as being illegal
in itself under the antitrust laws." GUIDE, supra note 2, at 25.
The GUIDE states that "there may be some circumstances when an exclusive
license barring United States sales by the non-United States party would raise
antitrust problems. The larger the period of exclusivity, the more serious these
problems would become." Id. at 26 (footnote omitted).
89. The Justice Department currently looks at mergers, and presumably it
would look at joint ventures, using current price and output as a benchmark.
See 1982 Merger Guidelines, supra note 22, at 25. Because this joint venture is
likely to decrease cost and increase output, it would not be objectionable from
that perspective.
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Metals' competition in the United States or the elimination of its
moderating effect as the most substantial potential entrant facilitates collusion, higher prices, and lower output.
These scenarios may be mere possibilities. The current Justice
Department would be reluctant to second-guess the parties' determination (if one was made) that the two restrictive covenants
were necessary to induce them to invest in the joint venture. If,
however, there is a United States market that is susceptible to
collusion, the Department may be concerned that the two covenants were devices to keep British Metals, an apparently important potential entrant, out of the United States and to divide
world markets. If this were found to be a likely purpose or effect
and the Department believed that the covenants ostensibly were
dispensable or overbroad, it probably would challenge them."0
E.

Case E: Manufacturing Joint Venture and Know-How
License

Hot Chip, the third largest United States manufacturer of key
transistor parts with about twenty-two percent of domestic sales,
wishes to enter the important Japanese market and has been unsuccessful in its attempt to do so. In order to enter the Japanese
market, it has formed a joint venture with Japan Manufacturing
(JM). JM is one of Japan's largest industrial entities; it manufactures electronic equipment but does not manufacture the transistor parts. The joint venture, JZC, will operate in Japan and will
use Hot Chip's know-how to produce transistors. Hot Chip is concerned that JZC will have lower costs than Hot Chip has in the
United States, and might out-compete it. Accordingly, Hot Chip
has obtained a covenant providing that neither JZC nor JM will
export the transistors to the United States or other designated
markets.
Is the joint venture permissible in essence? The Guide says
that it is, 91 and this is the response expected from the current
90. See Yamaha Motor Co. v. FTC, 657 F.2d 971 (8th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1768 (1982); see also Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United
States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951) (agreements to supress competition between separate

legal entities cannot be justified by calling the arrangement a "joint venture");
United States v. National Lead Co., 63 F. Supp. 513 (S.D.N.Y. 1945), aff'd, 332
U.S. 319 (1947) (combination of competitors who by agreement split the world
market violates the Sherman Antitrust Act).

91. See GUIDE, supra note 2, at 28-29.
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Justice Department. At worst, the joint venture would eliminate
possible competition from JM in the United States transistor part
market. It does not appear, however, that, absent the joint venture, JM would have developed transistor parts and entered the
United States market. Moreover, because JM was, at most, a potential producer of the product, it seems unlikely that JM would
be one of a small group of likely potential entrants into the
United States.
Is the collateral territorial restraint reasonably ancillary to the
main purpose of the contract? The Guide says that it probably is
not. The agreement permanently precludes JZC and JM from exporting the transistors to the United States. Hot Chip is concerned about a cost-cutting entrant, and, says the Guide, antitrust law is designed to preserve potential disruption from costcutting entrants.2 The Guide would place on "Hot Chip and JM
the burden to prove that the know-how being transferred is of
substantial value, and that the territorial restraint is no greater in
scope or duration than is necessary to prevent frustration of the
underlying contract. '9 3 It suggests that the appropriate duration
would be limited to the time it would take JM to develop
equivalent know-how by reverse engineering, and that a restraint
beyond this period would be virtually impossible to justify. 4
Current Justice Department officials would view the collateral
restraint more flexibly. 5 They would be particularly sympathetic
to credible claims by Hot Chip that Hot Chip would not have
entered into the joint venture agreement unless it could protect
its trade secrets by the covenant for which it bargained. Moreover, although this is a highly concentrated market, the facts do
not indicate that JM was a significant potential entrant. JZC and
JM would become potential entrants only by reason of Hot Chip's
initiation of the joint venture and sharing of its own technology.
Furthermore, there may be other more likely potential entrants.
Because a plaintiff could not establish that the joint venture
would lead to increased price and lessened output, it seems likely
that the Justice Department would not challenge the transaction.

92.
93.

Id.
Id. at 31 (footnote omitted). Hot Chip holds 49% of the stock of JZC. If

it had a majority interest, "there might be different considerations." Id. at 32.
94. Id. The "period of reverse engineering" is illusory. One cannot know how
long it will take a competitor to copy an invention.
95. See 1981 Interview with William F. Baxter, supra note 15, at 162-63.
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If, however, but for the joint venture, JM was one of few significant potential entrants into the United States market and the
market was susceptible to collusion, current Department officials
would be concerned about JM's permanent covenant not to compete. The Department would try to facilitate the transaction and
to protect domestic competition at the same time, and it would
probably, under these changed facts, impose on Hot Chip and JM
a burden of the sort that the Guide imposed. 96 At a minimum it
probably would disallow the restraint for a period longer than the
life of the know-how and longer than a period reasonably necessary to recoup the initial investment.
The essential difference between the Guide and the policy of
the early 1980s is that the Guide would approach the restrictive
covenant with skepticism because the market was highly concentrated and because JM could become an important potential entrant, whereas current policy would approach the whole transaction with favor and probably would not place burdens of
justification on the proponents of the joint venture unless the
transaction threatened a near-term rise in price.
F. Case F: Know-How License
Fast Technology, Inc. (FTI) is a small Massachusetts corporation that possesses valuable unpatented technology. It licenses
this technology for twenty years in return for a royalty to
Badische Maschinenwerke A.G. (BMW), a major manufacturer
located in Germany. FTI is a small, growing factor in the United
States market. It has not been successful in its export trade. By
granting BMW a license and selling domestically produced components and equipment to it, FTI hopes that it will be able to
export economically. BMW is a large, well-financed international
company, capable of invading the United States market through
use of FTI's technology. Fearing this result, FTI requires BMW
to agree that for twenty years it will not compete with FTI in the
United States in any product for which its licensed technology is
used. Also, FTI requires BMW to purchase and use only FTI
components in executing the licensed process.
96. If, but for the joint venture, JM would have entered the United States
market for the sale of transistor parts or transistors, and if its covenant not to
compete in the United States covered all transistors and parts, whether or not
made with Hot Chip's know-how, the covenant probably would have been iegal. See Yamaha Motor Co., 657 F.2d at 981.
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1. The TerritorialRestraint
Can FTI, as a condition of its know-how license, lawfully require licensee BMW to agree not to compete with FTI in the
United States for a term of years? Can that term be as long as
twenty years? The Guide states that FTI can exact an agreement
from BMW not to compete, presumably because FTI would not
have the incentive to license BMW if BMW could immediately
use the know-how in competition with FTIL97 The time period of
the restraint, however, must be reasonable. The Guide views
twenty years as unreasonable if twenty years is longer than necessary for reverse engineering "unless the parties could justify [the
twenty-year period] as necessary to the technology sharing
agreement."8
Current Justice Department officials would start the analysis
from a different reference point. They would start with a strong
presumption that the owner of technology should have the freedom to exploit it unilaterally in whatever way the owner sees fit
and by the most convenient means.9 9 The Department regards all
exploitation of technology as permissible under the antitrust laws
unless it aggrandizes the owner's monopoly or produces cartel
control beyond lawful ownership rights.100
Applying these principles, one could not condemn the twentyyear covenant not to compete on the basis of the stated facts.
There is one way in which a long-term export ban could produce
cartel control over the market for the product manufactured with
the United States licensor's technology, but Case F does not seem
97. See

GUIDE,

supra note 2, at 34.

98. Id. at 33.
99. See Remarks of A.B. Lipsky, Jr., supra note 23, at 14; see also Brief for
the United States as Amicus Curiae, on petition for a writ of certiorari, SCM
Corp. v. Xerox Corp., No. 80-2092 (U.S. Mar. 22, 1982) [hereinafter cited as

Brief]. The above references apply specifically to patents but seem applicable
also to know-how.
In its amicus brief, the Justice Department wrote:

When the parties to an agreement are without market power, the purpose
and, more importantly, the economic effect, if any, of their agreement can
be presumed to be to increase efficiency-thereby promoting consumer
welfare-where they cannot eliminate competition between themselves,
unduly enhance the value of one of their technologies, or restrict output in

any way.
Brief, supra, at 10 (footnote omitted).
100. Brief, supra note 99, at 10.
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to be that case. In order for FTI's export ban to facilitate cartel
control, the following would be necessary: the United States market would have to be highly concentrated with inelastic demand,
high barriers, and low supply substitutability; FTI's technology
would have to be a necessary ingredient of the end product; and
FTI itself would have to be a much larger factor than it is in the
United States market. Finally, it would be necessary to show that,
but for the licensing agreement, BMW probably would have derived the technology or a good substitute for it on its own within
a period less than the term of the restraint, that it would have
entered the United States market on its own or by licensing its
technology to a non-leading United States firm, and that it was
one of few potential entrants capable of so doing.
The difference between the 1977 Guide and enforcement policy
of the 1980s is the following: The Guide would regard the twentyyear ban as unreasonable if it unnecessarily excluded the independent competition of a major foreign manufacturer of related
products during a time period when the foreign manufacturer, if
it tried, could probably have derived the technology on its own.1°1
Current policy would not condemn such a restraint unless the
market was susceptible to collusion and the barred entry of the
licensee removed a force that would destabilize a cartel. 10 2
101. See GUIDE, supra note 2, at 33.
102. Because the covenant by definition restrains trade into the United
States of a major foreign manufacturer of related products capable of competing
with FTI in the United States, the GUIDE would give strict scrutiny to the re-

straint. Since the covenant on its face does not threaten output limitation in the
United States (indeed, it was exacted by a United States firm to exploit its technology abroad), current Justice Department officials would approach the transaction hospitably.

Moreover, unlike the GUIDE, the present Justice Department would not ask
whether the purposes of the transaction could be accomplished by a less restrictive alternative. In its brief in SCM Corporation v. Xerox Corporation, regarding
acquisition by Xerox of a patent, the Justice Department said:
The fact that a transfer of assets has taken place does not justify an at-

tempt by a court to impose a "least restrictive alternative" test on an otherwise legal use of assets, where the transfer itself has anticompetitive effects and the subsequently attained monopoly power is not attributable to
any unlawful practice.
The inherent uncertainties of a "least restrictive alternative" make it an
inappropriate standard under the antitrust laws . ...
Brief, supra note 99, at 13. By "anticompetitive," the Justice Department means
"that the decrease in consumer welfare resulting from restriction of output by
the parties is likely to exceed any increase in consumer welfare resulting from
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The Tie-In

The Guide states that if the know-how "is sufficiently valuable

to confer monopoly power, [the license] is a tie-in and would be
illegal per se . . . if practiced in the domestic market.' 1 03 As for
the international context, the Guide states vaguely, "the presumption against the legality of a tie-in may not necessarily be
absolute.

' 10 4

The tie-in would be of concern, the Guide continues,

only if it foreclosed other sellers engaged in United States commerce10 5 from sales of the tied product in the overseas market.10 6
As for domestic markets, the Guide reflects the latest Supreme
Court case law. If an owner of intellectual property has market
power in the market for its know-how, that owner may not legally
tie any substantial dollar amount of goods to the licensing of the
know-how. 10 7 The Supreme Court has never weakened this rule.
increased efficiency." Id. at 11.
103. GUIDE, supra note 2, at 35 (footnote omitted).
104. Id.
105. The GUIDE states that the exclusion of overseas suppliers from overseas
markets does not constitute United States foreign commerce, and hence United
States law does not apply. Id. at 34. This conclusion is not obvious because the
tie-in is in United States foreign commerce. See Rahl, American Antitrust and
Foreign Operations: What is Covered?, 8 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 1 (1974). Before
the enactment of the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act, supra note 5,
arguably the only appropriate questions were whether the tie-in violated standards of illegality, and if so whether the overseas supplier suffered an antitrust
injury. It was not apparent why an excluded foreign supplier had not been injured, while a similarly situated United States supplier clearly suffered antitrust
injury under the law. See Waldbaum v. Worldvision Entr's, 1978-2 Trade Cas.
(CCH) t1 62,378 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Industria Siciliana Asfalti Bitumi, S.p.A. v. Exxon Research & Eng'g Co., 1977-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 61,636 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).

The Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act preempts Waldbaum and
Industria.
106. As the GUIDE notes, a tie-in is justified if it is necessary to protect the
quality of the tying product. This may be the case when certain qualities of the
tied product are essential to the effective functioning of the tying product and
those qualities cannot be specified. GUIDE, supra note 2, at 34. The GUIDE suggests that even a goodwill justification is unreasonable beyond the period of "reverse-engineering." Id.
107. See United States v. Loew's, Inc., 371 U.S. 38 (1962) (a copyright on a
motion picture film is sufficient to confer the necessary power in the market for
the tying product); International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947)
(plaintiff need not prove lessened competition in the market for the tied product; it is enough that a not insubstantial dollar amount of commerce (e.g.,
$500,000) in the tied product is restrained); see also United States Steel Corp. v.
Fortner Entr's, Inc., 429 U.S. 610 (1977) [hereinafter cited as FortnerI]; Fort-
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The Court decided its last tie-in case in the early 1970s,101 however, and some lower courts, refusing to apply a per se rule, are
requiring the plaintiff to prove that competition in the market for
the tied product is lessened. 109
The traditional per se rule is based on the fact that tie-ins
have, by definition, the effect of depriving the customer of freedom of choice in selecting among competing sellers and depriving
competing sellers of the chance to supply those customers, and on
the perception that "tying arrangements generally served no legitimate business purpose that cannot be achieved in some less restrictive way . . . .""I The Guide reflects this perspective. Indeed, the concept of protecting export opportunities is based on
the value of open markets and freedom of access, and not in concerns regarding output limitation.""
In contrast, current Justice Department officials do not approve
112
of the per se rule against tie-ins even in the domestic market.
ner Entr's, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495 (1969) [hereinafter
cited as FortnerI].
108. FortnerII, 429 U.S. 610 (1977).
109. See, e.g., Kingsport Motors, Inc. v. Chrysler Motor Corp., 1981-1 Trade
Cas. (CCH) 63,888 (6th Cir. 1981); In re Data Gen. Corp. Antitrust Litig., 529
F. Supp. 801, 818 (N.D. Cal. 1981), app. pending. But see Betaseed, Inc. v. U
and I, Inc., 1982-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 64,878 at 72,710, 72,414-15 (9th Cir.
1982).
110. FortnerI, 394 U.S. at 503.
111. The GUIDE's implicit recommendation, however, would lead to strange
results. It suggests that if FTI wishes to tie its components to its technology, it
should require the licensee to purchase components of United States suppliers,
rather than components of FTI. See GuIDE, supra note 2, at 35. In the example,
however, FTI decided to license its know-how, which it might otherwise have
kept secret from its potential competitors, in order to gain access to an export
market for its components. If FTI cannot assure sales of its components in Germany, its reason for the transaction will fail. It seems unlikely that FTI would
be willing to use the entree derived from its know-how to provide itself with the
mere opportunity, shared with its United States competitors, to try to win the
business of BMW.
In the example, the tie-in makes possible export trade that would not otherwise exist. Therefore, competitors would be no better off without the licensing
agreement than they would be with it. Moreover, no United States consumers
are injured. Arguably, it is unreasonable for United States law to condemn the

tie.
112. Vertical Restraints and Tying-Justice Department Views, 5 TRADE
T50,433 (1981) (remarks of Ronald G. Carr, Deputy Assistant

REG. REP. (CCH)

Attorney General, Antitrust Division).
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The Department believes tie-ins are likely to be efficient.' 13 Government enforcers would worry about FTI's tie-in in the domestic
market only if the tie-in could feasibly be used "to achieve an
independently based monopoly position" in the market for components, 1 4 or to facilitate collusion.'1 5 In the international context, it is even more difficult to imagine a tie-in that would inflict
output-limiting injury on United States competition. Unless the
tie-in will lead to monopolization of a world market or of goods
re-exported to the United States, or unless United States competitors would be foreclosed from access to so vital an outlet that
foreclosure would concentrate the United States market to a

point where collusion would be a dangerous risk, the foreclosure
of United States competitors' export opportunities would not rise
to such a level that the Justice Department would condemn.""
Case F is the first illustrative case in the Guide that requires
analysis under the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of
1982. The new statute reinforces, at least in part, the Guide's
analysis. Pursuant to title IV of the new Act, which promulgates
section 7 of the Sherman Act, FTI's requirement that the German
licensee of its technology purchase components only from FTI is
covered by the Sherman Act only if it has "a direct, substantial,
and reasonably foreseeable effect . . . on export trade or commerce with foreign nations, of a person engaged in such trade or

commerce in the United States.

. . . 11

If FTI's tie-in does have

such an effect, then the Sherman Act applies "only for injury to

113. Id.
114. 1982 Interview with William F. Baxter, supra note 15, at 33-34.

115. A tie-in may produce inefficiency in the form of output limitation in two
cases. In both cases, it must be possible to monopolize the market for the tied
product; there must be low elasticity of demand, high barriers, and low supply

substitutability. First, a tie-in may restrict output if power over the tying product confers power over the tied product. For example, in the early 1900s the
patentee of the only movie film projector required theatre owners to use only the

patentee's movie films with its projector, thereby threatening to extend the patentee's monopoly to movie films. See Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal
Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502 (1917). Alternatively, a tie-in can restrain output if
it facilitates collusion. This could occur if the tie removes such a significant

share of the market from competition that it deprives the remaining competitors
of sufficient market share to maintain optimum size, and thus further concentrates the market.
116. See 1982 Merger Guidelines, supra note 22, at 49-50.
117. See full statutory language, supra note 5.
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export business in the United States." 118 The relevant question
under section 7 of the Sherman Act is: Are there other persons
engaged in export commerce in the United States 1' 9 that could
sell components of the type required by the German licensee? If
so, the substantive principles of the Sherman Act apply to the
extent that their export business is injured.
Several technical points could be raised in an attempt to bring
FTI's tie-in totally within the language of section 7 of the Sherman Act. FTI might assert, in an action against it by United
States producer A who was ready and able to supply the needed
components to BMW, that the tie-in did not have a "direct" effect on A because the only direct victim of a tie-in is the coerced
purchaser; any other effect is incidental and merely speculative.
Second, FTI might assert that the opportunity to supply the components to BMW existed only because of BMW's desire for FTI's
technology; that FTI would not supply its technology unless it
supplied its components, and therefore, but for the tie, there

would be no export opportunity at all. 120 Third, FTI might claim,
there is no more reason to suppose that A or another United
States exporter would win the competition to supply BMW's
needs than to suppose that Mitsui, Mitsubishi, or any one of a
number of other foreign producers would have won the business.
Therefore, FTI might claim that the impact on United States export trade is indirect and speculative. FTI might claim also that
any effect was not "substantial" for the foregoing reasons and on
grounds that the opportunity foreclosed represented a minute
percentage of the world market.
These arguments seem contrary to the spirit of section 7, which
merely confines Sherman Act application to cases in which inter-

118. Id.
119. The statutory language refers to an effect on the export commerce of a
person "engaged in" export commerce in the United States. There would seem
to be no policy reason why the person must be actually engaged in export commerce rather than actually or potentially so engaged, since the purpose of the

statute is to limit the Sherman Act without interfering with United States interests. If FTI forces BMW to purchase FTI components in order to get its technology, and United States company A is ready and able to supply the components (and, a fortiori, if it was competing for the right to do so just before FTI's

transaction was concluded), it should make no difference that A has previously
made no sales in export trade.
120. See supra note 111.
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ests of the United States are at stake.121 The fact that a tie-in by
a producer in the United States excludes or arguably excludes a
competitor in the United States should be a sufficient basis for
holding section 7's limitation inapplicable. 122 The issues raised in
the paragraph above should be heard in the context of litigating
the section 1 claim. Otherwise, the mini-trial necessary for determining the mere applicability of the Sherman Act would create
an extra layer of litigation, interfere with the efficient conduct of
litigation, and thus impair the enforcement of the antitrust laws.
G. Case G: Tying of Licensed Technology
In Case G, Big Wheels Corporation, a major United States
manufacturer, wishes to do business in X, a less developed country. It finds exporting to X impractical in view of restrictive local
laws, and therefore decides to license a local company to manufacture its products under Big Wheels' country X patents and Big
Wheels' know-how. Royalty rates in X are subject to government
approval and are "notoriously low." To get an acceptable return,
Big Wheels decides to impose the following conditions: (1) the licensee must buy, exclusively from Big Wheels, all components,
supplies, and equipment necessary to manufacture under the license, and (2) the licensee must take a license for certain other
patents, which the licensee has no intention of using.1 3
The Guide notes the United States rule: It is per se illegal1 24 to
require a licensee to take unwanted patents in order to get a desired patent. It adds, however, that the Department would be unlikely to invoke the United States antitrust laws unless the packaged license would have a material effect on United States
exports or imports. Likewise, even prior to enactment of the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act,1 2 5 current Department

officials could be expected not to enforce the law against the
121. See Report of the Judiciary Committee of the House of Representatives
on H.R. 5235, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981), reprinted in 43 ANTITRUST & TRADE
REG. REP. (BNA) No. 1076, at 306, 308-09 (1982).
122.

Id. at 309.

123.

GUIDE,

supra note 2, at 37. The tie-in analysis is similar to that in Case

F and will not be repeated. Case G frames the question as follows: Whether the
tie "unreasonably forecloses other U. S.-based sellers from making sales, or affects goods reexported to the United States." Id. at 37-38.

124. Id. at 37.
125. See supra text accompanying note 5.
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package licensing. A JustiCe Department official has noted that
package patent licensing may be efficient, for it may avoid costly
separate negotiations among licensees. In any event, "[the patentee's] return is necessarily limited to the maximum amount that
he could extract lawfully in a world of perfect information and
zero transaction costs. Thus, the practice of package licensing
ought not be subjected to any general prohibition on antitrust
26

grounds.M

Despite the Department's position, tying of one patent to another in domestic commerce remains illegal per se under the
United States antitrust laws.12 It appears, however, that no
United States competitor or consumer will suffer antitrust injury
as a result of the tie. Therefore, under the new section 7 of the
Sherman Act, the prohibitions of the Sherman Act are not
128
applicable.
H.

Case I: Exclusive Grantback Licensing

United States company X has granted a license to a leading
local firm in country C to practice certain patents and know-how
in that country. The local firm has agreed to grant back to X title
to or an exclusive license for any new patents or know-how the
local firm may obtain or develop related to the licensed technology rights. The local firm has agreed to pay X a royalty.12
The Guide "questions the need for and appropriateness of exclusive grantback provisions" 1 0 and suggests that an exclusive
grantback may be illegal when the licensee is a leading firm in its
country, it is capable of competing in the United States, and the
exclusive grantback broadly includes any new patent or know-

how related to the licensed technology. When this is the case, the
grantback clause may enable the licensor to "carve out for [itself]
broad spheres of territorial and market exclusivity affecting U.S.
126. Remarks of A.B. Lipsky, Jr., supra note 23, at 55,989. It may be the
case that the package license is in fraud of the foreign government's regulations
because the government of X allows only a specified return on each patent. The
package was a method to circumvent government policy. If the package license
were otherwise illegal under United States law, it would be particularly inappropriate to allow invocation of the foreign government's regulations as a defense.
127. See, e.g., American Sec. Co. v. Shatterproof Glass Corp., 268 F.2d 769,
777 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 902 (1959).
128. See supra text accompanying note 5.
129. GUIDE, supra note 2, at 42.
130. Id.
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commerce. [The restriction] may isolate the U.S. market from significant import competition from a leading foreign firm."1 1 On
the other hand, a grantback obligation, even an exclusive
grantback, is likely to be reasonable and thus legal where the obligation is narrowly defined, limited to the term of the original
patent, and limited to improvement patents that could not be
132
used alone without infringing the original licensed patent.
Current Justice Department officials agree that exclusive
grantbacks have the "troublesome. . . tendency to reduce the incentives of licensees to engage in their own inventive activity, and
to guarantee the licensor that its licensee-competitors will obtain
no unique advantage over it. 1'" S The Department further agrees
that, in the extreme case, when an exclusive grantback provision
is in licenses granted to most of the significant actual or potential
competitors of the patentee, and when it applies to all related
technology, whether or not the subject of the grantback is an improvement to the patent, the practice would be objectionable.'3
"Between the extremes, our approach must necessarily constitute

a fact-sensitive and careful evaluation of the risks that the incentives to invent have been sacrificed to a degree unnecessary for
adequate exploitation of the patentee's monopoly rights."'1 "
The Guide and current policy thus seem remarkably similar.
One would expect, however, that current enforcement authorities
would place great emphasis on market questions. What is the
market? What are the buyers' alternatives? Are producers few?
Who are the potential entrants? Are barriers high? These questions, which are so central to currently accepted modes of analysis, are not even posed in the statement of Case I.
I.

Case J: Exclusive Distributorship

USC and GAG are substantial, nondominant manufacturers of
machine tools within the United States and Germany, respectively. Their lines of tools are essentially complementary, but a
few of their products are directly interchangeable. Neither makes
substantial sales in the home country of the other. USC wishes to
appoint GAG as its exclusive distributor in the European Com131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

Id. at 43.
Id.
Remarks of A.B. Lipsky, Jr., supra note 23, at 55,988.
Id.
Id.
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mon Market, and GAG wishes to appoint USC as its exclusive
distributor in North America. The appointment will be for a term
of five years. Each would prohibit the other forty distributors of
its products worldwide from re-exporting its products into either
the Common Market or the United States. Each recognizes that
the other, as a distributor, is not likely to promote sales of the
imported products that are competitive with products produced
by the distributor. Nevertheless, each believes that its local exports will be greater if sales are promoted by a well-established
distributor than if it were to distribute through an independent
firm.3136

Is the agreement lawful? The Guide answers no, in light of
then-existing law.13 7 It interprets the arrangement as a territorial
allocation between substantial manufacturers which can compete
in the territory of the other, and states that the exclusive appointment and the agreement to restrict exports by other distributors fall within the per se rule of Timken,138 Topco,139 and
Schwinn.

4

0

The Guide suggests that the arrangement might be

treated differently if the competitive products were excluded
from the exclusive distributorship, and that an even safer course

would be for each manufacturer to appoint someone other than a
14 1
competitor as its exclusive foreign distributor.
Changes in the law since the Guide was issued, particularly the
overruling of Schwinn by GTE Sylvania,1 42 would require a different result today. To the extent that the restraint is vertical, as
it appears to be, the entire arrangement will be judged under the
rule of reason and probably will be legal unless it restrains interbrand competition.1 43 The Justice Department would ask the following questions, focusing on the companies' tool lines that are
competitive: Is the American market highly concentrated? Does it
have high barriers to entry and low elasticity of demand? Is GAG
one of few substantial likely entrants into the United States mar-

136. GUIDE, supra note 2, at 45.
137.

Id. at 46.

138. Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593, 596 (1951).
139. United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972).
140. United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967), overruled,
Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
141. GUIDE, supra note 2, at 47.
142. See supra note 80.
143. See Continental T.V., Inc., 433 U.S. 36; In re Beltone Elec. Corp., 3
TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 21,934 (July 6, 1982).
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ket, and would it have entered as an effective independent force
in the United States market but for the exclusive distributorship
agreement? Only if all of the answers are in the affirmative would
the Justice Department have any concerns about the exclusive
distribution. 14 4 If all of the questions are answered in the affirmative, the elimination of GAG as an independent competitor in the
United States might facilitate collusion or remove an important
opportunity to dissipate collusion. Otherwise, the arrangement
would be viewed as pro-competitive; the whole point of the arrangement was to sell more, not less, and each party believed that
45
1
this would be the result.

The parties also agreed to restrict exports by their other distributors. Most importantly, GAG agreed that none of GAG's
German products will be re-exported to the United States. This
undertaking was part of a vertical agreement whereby GAG induced USC to work the territory more fully and to promote
GAG's product without fear that its promotional efforts would be
the subject of a free ride by intrabrand competitors. Again, unless
conditions for collusion are present, and this does not appear to
be the case, the Justice Department would not disapprove the

restraint.
J. Case M: Political Risk Insurance
Four United States companies-A, B, C, and Maverick- operate oil concessions in an African country and in a Latin American
country. They are concerned about the long-term stability of
their operations and about their bargaining position with both
governments. They are also concerned about continued access to
low sulfur oil from the African country because they must have
this low sulfur oil to comply with environmental standards, and
substitutes are scarce. A, B, C, and two major Western European
companies that operate concessions in the African country agree
to form a joint venture company incorporated in the Bahamas
and called Oil Guarantee Ltd. Each member gives backup commitments to the other members by providing for a "pool" and
144. See 1982 Merger
145. Filling out a line
particularly where buyers
a line. To the extent that

Guidelines, supra note 22, at 39-43.
of complementary products may increase efficiencies,
often need either a full line or several products within
USC will probably not push the few competitive tools

of GAG, the consumer is protected by the competition offered by the tools of
other manufacturers.
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guaranteeing that each member is entitled to a pro rata share of

that pool based on prior production percentages.14 Each member
thereby strengthens its bargaining position against the host governments. Maverick has not been included in this joint venture
because A, B, and C wished to exclude it. Maverick "has been an
unpredictable factor in the industry and an important source of
'1
supply to independent refiners in the United States. 1 17
The Guide notes that the joint venture was in essence reasonable. It was reasonably necessary for "the sharing of large and unusual risks. ' 148 Moreover, it imposes no impermissible collateral
restraint on any individual member's ability to compete. 4 9 The
Guide suggests, however, that the joint venturers should establish
a termination date to avoid the risk that the joint venture might
remain as "a forum for cooperation among its competitor-members after its original purposes pass." 150
Is the joint venture an essential facility which places the excluded firm "at a serious disadvantage in its efforts to import oil
and compete in the United States?"1 51 If so, the Guide says, exclusion of Maverick would constitute a violation of section 1 of
the Sherman Act, and the joint venturers must give Maverick access on equitable terms. 152 The question whether the joint venture is an essential facility "will depend on how much it adds to
the members' ability to bargain with the foreign government and
to enter into . . . contracts for delivery of oil to U.S. customers."15 3 Moreover, says the Guide, if Maverick was excluded as

punishment for its independent competitive tactics, this fact
would tend to rebut any good faith defense on the part of the
joint venturers, and would be an additional relevant factor in
favor of compulsory access for Maverick.

146. The GUIDE may have reference to a political risk insurance-pool such as
that formed by United States oil companies having concessions in Libya. The
companies agreed that, if the concession of any one company was nationalized,
the victim of the nationalization would receive a backup supply from a pool consisting of oil produced in Libya by all other members of the pool. See Hunt v.
Mobil Oil Corp., 550 F.2d 68 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 984 (1979).
147. GUIDE, supra note 2, at 57.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 58.

150. Id.
151. Id. at 59.
152. Id.
153. Id.
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Current Justice Department analysis of the essence of the
transaction would be similar. The only real concern regarding formation of the joint venture is whether it will be used as a forum
for cooperation among competitors in a concentrated, high-barrier
United States market. This concern can be addressed by precautions against opportunities for collusion.
Current Justice Department officials would formulate the access question differently from the Guide, but they could reach the
same result. Justice Department officials would bridle at the suggestion that a joint venture which places a firm at a "serious disadvantage" becomes, for that reason, an essential facility to which
all competitors must have access.154 If the exclusion is not likely
to affect the price of oil in the United States, the Department
would not have an antitrust concern. The exclusion would be
likely to affect the price of oil in the United States if: the United
States market is highly concentrated; Maverick is a disruptive
force in the market and tends to destabilize a cartel; the low sulfur African oil is a scarce and necessary input unavailable elsewhere; and, by excluding Maverick, A, B, and C significantly increase an already significant risk that Maverick will lose its access
to the low sulfur African oil and thus eliminate Maverick as an
155
important competitor.

If, on the other hand, the exclusion merely harms a competitor
(Maverick) without harming competition and the consumers in
the United States (because competition in the United States market is sufficient to guard against cartel behavior), the current Justice Department is not likely to have any antitrust objections; it
will leave Maverick to its own remedies. 56
Application of the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act

to the facts of Case M confirms and complements the Guide's
analysis. Even if the joint bargaining by the five major oil compa154. See 1981 Interview with William F. Baxter, supra note 15, at 153, 155.
155. See 1982 Merger Guidelines, supra note 22, at 37. In determining
whether a merger of competitors is collusive, the Department of Justice consid-

ers the following factor, among others: "[Whether] the firm to be acquired has
been an unusually disruptive and competitive influence in the market. Before

invoking this factor, the Department will determine whether the market is one
in which performance might plausibly deteriorate because of the elimination of

one disruptive firm." Id.
156. See Products Liab. Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Crum & Forster Ins. Cos., 1982-2
Trade Cas. (CCH) 64,813 (7th Cir. 1982) (reflecting the antitrust philosophy
articulated by officials of the Administration).
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nies was undertaken solely to extract better terms from two foreign governments, the joint venture would not consitute a pricefixing violation under section 1 of the Sherman Act if the only
direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect was on the
foreign governments and their citizens. 15 7 On the other hand, even
if the joint venture reflects a legitimate pooling of risks, which
appears to be the case, it will nonetheless run afoul of the Sherman Act if its operation has a direct, substantial, and reasonably
foreseeable spill-over effect on the price of the oil shipped back to
the United States or otherwise on competition within the United
States. The parties, however, should be able to protect adequately
against this risk by structural precautions. Finally, in connection
with Maverick's claim of exclusion, section 7 of the Sherman Act
gives no protection, and the usual substantive principles apply. 158
The parties to this joint venture would not have the right to
seek an export trade certificate of review from the Secretary of
Commerce under the procedure established by the Export Trading Company Act because the procedure is applicable only to export activity and is not available in cases in which the activity is

expected to result in the sale of goods or services in the United

States. 1 59

IV.

CONCLUSION

A comparison of current enforcement policy with the 1977
Guide leads to the following conclusions. The Justice Department
of the early 1980s is even more determined than was the Justice
Department of 1977 to facilitate, and not to abort, exports and
investment abroad. Its more permissive policy flows from (1) its
view that private business decisions are nearly always efficiencyproducing, and therefore should be viewed favorably, (2) its view
that the sole target of antitrust law should be inefficiency, (3) its
definition of "inefficient transactions" as only those that artificially reduce output, and (4) case law developed over the past
eight years that stresses the role of economic analysis in antitrust
law.
Few transactions by United States producers designed to facilitate exports, marketing, and investment abroad are likely to
157. See supra note 5 (§ 402 of Pub. L. No. 97-290 (Oct. 8, 1982) adding § 7
to the Sherman Act)).

158. Id.
159.

See supra note 7.
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lessen output in a way that impacts upon United States consumers. Thus, Justice Department policy of the early 1980s signals a
green light for exports and foreign investment.

